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601 A. D. TO 1520 A. D.
The purpose of this article is to show the origin of the doctrine
of consideration. Two agencies which may have had much to
do with the shaping of the common-law doctrine of consideration
will only incidentally be referred to. One is the jurisdiction of
the chancellor over parol contracts before assumpsit. The other
is the enforcement of parol contracts in the local courts. The
first has already been ably treated.- The second should be
worked out. It is felt, however, that research in that line is
a large field in itself; and furthermore, that it is unnecessary
for the purpose of proving the proposition to be submitted. It
is believed that whatever influence the practice of the courts of
chancery and the local courts may have had, and it is not sug-
gested that it may not have been considerable, the doctrine of
consideration would nevertheless have developed in the com-
mon law much as we find it to-day. In other words, the
matter can be satisfactorily explained without going outside of
the law of the king's law courts and the Anglo-Saxon law prior
to the undertaking of contract jurisdiction by the king's courts.
Before an affirmative demonstration is taken up the ground
must be cleared of an hypothesis, namely, that of Professor
Ames, to the effect that consideration had its origin in the
detriment suffered in deceit. The eminence of the author of the
hypothesis and its very general acceptance make this task doubly
necessary. It will be undertaken in Part I. In Part n, will be
set forth a line of precedents going back to our earliest records
of the Anglo-Saxons in England-this series of authorities being
offered as the foundation of consideration.
I
Professor Ames has given us a history of the action of assump-
sit.2 It has been assumed that it accounts for the origin of the
doctrine of consideration. In fact Professor Ames so intimates.
Is there in truth a sufficient basis for such assumption?
The reasoning seems to be as follows: (i) It is shown that
the action of trespass on the case in the form of deceit became
'Barbour, History of Contract in Early English Equity.
' (1888) 2 HARV. L. Rzv. i.
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the contract action of assumpsit; (2) the damage to the plaintiff
in the action of deceit is assumed to be the foundation of the
"detriment to the promisee" in the doctrine of consideration;
(3) the identification must be correct, for no other explanation
of the origin of the doctrine has been offered which accounts
for the "detriment" aspect.
An attempt will be made here to show that there is no basis
in logic or in the cases for such identification. It was necessary
to allege in the declaration of assumpsit deceit and damages.
It will perhaps not be contended that the allegation of deceit
was taken seriously. For as soon as it had been held that
deceit would lie, the word "deceit" was apparently never used
again in the opinions of the judges. It is not mentioned in the
excellent collection of cases to show the history of assumpsit
in Williston, Cases on Contracts. No lawyer thought it worth
while to argue that a breach of contract was a deceit for the
very good reasons, we may take it, that he could not do so
honestly and in addition was not required to do so by the
courts. A showing of a breach of contract at once became
sufficient to satisfy the allegation of deceit.
If the judges did not believe that a breach of contract was a
deceit, and did not require proof of deceit, why should they
have required the detriment suffered by reason of a deceit to be
proved; and why in doing so should they require that the detri-
ment must be suffered at the time the promise was made or the
offer accepted? There is certainly no reason to believe that they
acted so contrary to logic and common sense; that they took
such an extraordinary leap; that instead of looking for the
damages to satisfy the allegation of the declaration in the obvious
place, the damages suffered by the breach, they went back to
the time the contract was made.
It may, however, be suggested that the judges acted on the
assumption that a deceit had actually taken place; that they
either believed such to be the case, or at any rate treated the
matter as if there had been a deceit. If so, the reasoning must
have been as follows. A has parted with money or property in
exchange for B's promise. He has done so in reliance on B's
representations that the promise is a good one, one that will be
carried out. The promise is not performed. Therefore, it was
not a good one, but mere worthless words. Therefore, A has
been deceived. The deceit took place at the time the promise
was made; also the damages suffered in reliance must be sought
at the time.
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Of course, such is not the truth. If B had had the intention
not to perform when he made the promise, and A had been
misled, there clearly would have been a tort. Such was not the
case; but conceivably the courts might have gone on the assump-
tion that it was. The answer is that they did not, if we may
judge from what the judges said in the reported cases. They
were not so stupid as to be deceived themselves, nor did they
pretend to be.
The leading case to show the transition, that is, the begin-
ning of the application of case as a remedy for breach of con-
tract, appears to be Year Book, 2o Hen. VI, chap. 34 pl. 4 in
1442 A. D. It is a leading case because it gives us the argu-
ments which influenced the judges. The following translation
is offered in the hope that it will make clear the attitude of
mind of the judges :29
A bill of deceit against John Doig in the K. B. counted that
he, plaintiff, had bargained with the said John on a certain day
to buy from him so much land for iooE and had paid him; that
he would enfeoff the said plaintiff within fourteen days after
the year. The said John enfeoffed another with the land, and
thereby deceived the plaintiff. Defendant demurred, saying that
plaintiff should have an action for breach of covenant and not
this action. In the Exchequer Chamber, Ascoughe [J.]. If a
carpenter undertakes to do work for me and does not do it, I
shall not have an action of trespass, but only an action of cove-
nant if I have a specialty; but if he builds the house poorly, then
I shall have an action of trespass on the case, for the malfeasance
is the cause of my action; and so in our case if the defendant
had retained the land in his hand without making a feoffment,
in that case the plaintiff would have only an action of covenant.
And I consider it the same case when the defendant enfeoffs a
stranger, and when he retains the land in his hand, wherefore
the action does not lie. Also this bill reads "He bargained ad
amend," and by these words it is proved that he himself bought;
wherefore there was no deceit when they did not agree on the
bargain.
Paston [J.]. Yes sir, the bargain proves agreement, namely,
when the money was paid.
'= The tuthor gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance rendered
by Dr. George F_. Woodbine, of Yale University, in revising the trans-
lation of this case.
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Babth. Take the case where the defendant after the bargain
charges the same land, and then enfeoffs the plaintiff; now he
would not have an action of deceit. (To which Ascoughe
agreed.)
Babth. And according to my understanding, the law is the
same where the defendant has charged the land, and where he
enfeoffs another of all the land. Wherefore, etc.
Wanf. The defendant has done a thing badly for which the
action of deceit will lie; for when he has enfeoffed a stranger,
by that act he has disabled himself from making a feoffment to
the plaintiff, even though he should purchase the land again and
enfeoff him; for if he had a warranty for the first possession
to heirs and assigns, in that case if he had enfeoffed the plaintiff
according to the bargain he would be able to have voucher as
assign, and now by the feoffment and the retaking before the
feoffment to the plaintiff he is in another estate, and so the
voucher as assign is lost, for upon that inability is this action
founded. And so if I retain a person to purchase for me a
manor for a certain sum, and then he buys the manor for himself,
upon that I shall have an action for deceit. Thus it is in our
case. Wherefore, etc.
Stokes had the same understanding of it. For suppose I retain
one learned in the law to be my counsel with me at the Guildhall
in London at such a day, at which day he does not come, where-
fore my case is lost, now he is chargeable by me in an action of
deceit; and yet he has done nothing, but because he did not do
that which he undertook to do, by which I have been damaged,
he will be charged in deceit.
Paston [J.]. Suppose that a man bargains to enfeoff me, as
in our case, afterwards he enfeoffs another, and then re-enters
and enfeoffs me, and the other ousts me; now action of covenant
fails, for he has enfeoffed me according to his covenant, and
yet the deceit remains upon which the action is founded; and
that proves that it is not clear always that where there is cov-
enant, there an action of deceit does not lie. Wherefore, etc.
Babth. Suppose that the defendant had enfeoffed a stranger,
and had received back to himself the estate in tail, and then
enfeoffed the plaintiff; is not that a great deceit (It surely is.
[Q.d. quod sic] ), and still that sounds in covenant. Where-
fore, etc.
Ascoughe [J.]. If the feoffment was made by such a fraud,
it is wrongfully done as in the case of misfeasance above, but in
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our case no feoffment is made to the plaintiff either wrongfully
or rightfully, and so there is no wrong except his breach of the
covenant. Wherefore, etc.
Newton [J.]. The defendant has disabled himself from per-
forming his covenant with the plaintiff, because he has enfeoffed
another; and also the day has passed before which the feoff-
ment should have been made; for what purpose should he have
a writ of covenant when the defendant is not able to perform
the covenant with him even though he has a specialty? (For no
purpose, Q.d.) And then when the plaintiff has made a complete
bargain with the defendant, now the defendant can demand his
money in an action of debt, and in conscience and in right the
plaintiff ought to have the land, even though the property can-
not pass to him by law without livery of seisin. Then that would
be marvellous law, that a bargain should be made by which one
party would be bound by an action of debt, and that he should
be without remedy against the other; for which reason the action
of deceit well lies.
Fortescue [J.]. If I lease land by an indenture made for a
term of years, and then I oust him within the term, and per-
adventure the tenant within twenty years after the end of the
term brings an action of covenant against me, that well lies.
Still he cannot recover the term, yet he may recover damages;
and so in our case. And as to the fact that he has said that
he has disabled himself, and upon this the action of deceit is
based; I will put you a case in which the party has. disabled
himself, and yet no action will be there except covenant. As
suppose I make a lease to Paston for a term of years, and I
then lease the same land to Godred who occupies it; now I have
disabled myself from making a lease to Paston, and yet he will
have nothing except an action of covenant against me. Where-
fore, etc.
Paston [J.]. Even if a man is able to have an action of cove-
nant, yet that does not prove that he cannot bring an action of
deceit; for all the covenants may be kept and still it is deceit.
As suppose that a carpenter takes it upon himself to build me a
house of a certain length, width and height, which he builds,
but he makes a default in misjoining, or something of that sort,
which is outside of the covenant; I cannot sue him in covenant
because he has kept all of his covenants, but I have an action
of trespass on the case for what he has done wrong. So here,
even though I should have an action for breach of covenant,
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yet because he has disabled himself, as abbve, I shall have an
action of deceit. Wherefore, etc.
Newton [J.]. If I deliver a certain sum of money to Paston
to deliver to Fortescue, if Paston does not deliver it, he is
chargeable to me in an action of account, and also in an action
of debt, and it is at my pleasure which I shall elect; but when
I have obtained the result of one of the actions, the other is
gone. So in our case there are the actions of covenant and
deceit; and therefore the plaintiff may use deceit if he wishes.
Wherefore, etc.
Fray [S.]. If in our case the defendant had ousted his feoffee
and then had enfeoffed the plaintiff, then all of the covenants
would be fulfilled: suppose afterwards the feoffee ousts the
plaintiff, would he not have an action for that, because he could
not have an action of covenant? I say that he would.
Ascoughe [J.]. No sir, he would have an action of deceit in
your case; for it was his own folly to take an estate that was
defeasible, where he could have refused the estate and held the
defendant in an action of covenant, which lies up to the time the
estate is taken.
Paston [J.]. It is not true that in every bargain there is a
covenant, for if I buy a horse of you without warranty of sound-
ness, there is no covenant there, and yet there is a bargain; and
if he is sick in his body I would have an action of trespass on
the case against you, and shall aver that you sold him to me
knowing him to be sick. And there was a case in the Common
Bench where the plaintiff bargained to have fourteen bags of
grain of the defendant, the defendant knowing the said grain
to be mixed with sand sold it to him, and the action was well
maintainable. But see the record, for there there was a war-
ranty that the said grain was merchantable, wherefore there is
good reason why the plaintiff should have an action of deceit
in such a bargain, even though he could bring covenant if he
had a specialty.
Westbury [J.]. If one after such a bargain, as in our case,
and before the feoffment, make a statute merchant, and then
make the feoffment, the party would have an action of deceit;
and so here.
Fortescue [J.]. If the case be law which Newton has put,
then there is no question of the law in our case, for if each party
shall be bound by action in one bargain, then it is meet that this
action of deceit be maintained.
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Paston [J.]. Let us then to this case.
Fortescue [J.]. Willingly. And sir, I wish to prove that if
I buy a horse from you, the property of the horse is at once in
me, and you would have an action of debt for the purchase
price, and I would have-an action of detinue for the horse on
this bargain; but that is not so in our case, for although the
plaintiff has a right to the land in conscience, yet the land does
not pass without livery of seisin. Wherefore, etc.
Paston [J.]. In your case the contract is good without a
specialty, and a good contract binds both parties; what reason
is there then in allowing one party the action of debt, and not
allowing the other an action? Q.d. non est ratio, when in right
he should have the land. Et adjornatur.
The case was adjourned, but in a short time thereafter the
action was allowed in a case with similar facts.8 In the latter
case there was not a full discussion as in the case in 144:2 A D.
quoted in full. We may take it, however, that the same con-
siderations influenced the decision. In the earlier case all of
the judges of the Exchequer Chamber except Ascoughe were
clearly in favor of allowing the action, and it does not appear
that he seriously opposed the policy involved. But several of
them pointed out that there was no deceit in fact and that to
permit the writ to lie would be allowing its use for breach of
contract generally.
Some of the judges attempted a plausible argument which
probably all present recognized to be unsound. They suggested
that if the defendant after having conveyed to a stranger had
then entered and enfeoffed the plaintiff he would have been
guilty of deceit, assuming the plaintiff thought he was getting
the title. It was recognized as unsound. As Ascoughe says:
"but in our case no feoffment was made to the plaintiff
bad or good and therefore there is no wrong in this case
except the breach of the covenant."
The answer by the advocates of the innovation was that the
result was just as unfortunate as if there had been a deceit.
When the plaintiff has paid his money he ought in conscience
and right to have the land, and not being able to get that should
have damages. If there had been a sale of personalty which
had been delivered the unpaid vendor could bring an action of
debt and the purchaser, who had paid and had not received the
' (x488) Year Book 3 Hen. VII, 14, pL 2o.
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goods, an action of detinue in which damages might be recovered.
So in a sale of land as the vendor may sue in debt, the vendee
should have an action.
Let us then turn to the pleadings. If we take the original
writ for trespass on the case in assumpsit,' we see the allega-
tion of a promise and the allegation of consideration therefor,
and further on the words quoted by Professor Ames
5 :
"Yet the said C. D. not regarding his said promise and
undertaking, but contriving and fraudulently intending,
craftily and subtilly, to deceive and defraud, the said A. B.
in this behalf, hath not yet paid the said sum of money,
or any part thereof, to the said A. B. although oftentimes
afterwards requested," etc.
The declaration in assumpsit follows the same lines and uses
the same words quoted.6
Such are the statements in the pleadings of a hundred years
ago. They are without doubt the very same words as used when
assumpsit was first brought.
7 The declaration contained allega-
tions of a promise, a consideration, and a breach, and these were
the material allegations, the ones discussed in the cases. What-
ever else was said was mere surplusage. Some of the words
used in the writ of deceit may have remained. We find the
above quoted words as late as 1824, and as Professor Ames says
they point unmistakably to. the origin of the action. But 
that
does not mean that they were material. It is submitted that not
a single contract case can be shown in which issue was taken
on the allegation of fraudulent or deceitful intent.
There is nothing in the opinions of the courts, or in the plead-
ings, to indicate that the allegation of deceit was ever taken
seriously. There is not a word in the cases to show that if 
it
was taken seriously the deceit, or wrong, or the damage there-
from was conceived of as having taken place at the time 
the
promise was made. There is not a word in the pleadings 
to
suggest it. The above words alleging fraudulent intent follow
the allegation of a breach and claim that the breach is the fraud.
If there is any identification of the detriment from deceit, 
and
detriment in contract cases, it is clearly the detriment suffered
'See Stephen, Pleading (ed., 1824) p. 17.
5 (1888) 2 HARv. L. REv. 16.
'Stephen, Pleading (ed., 1824) p. 47.
'See Brown, Placita Generalia (pub., 1703) Vol. II, p. 35 ff.
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at the time of the breach and because of the breach, and not the
detriment suffered by the promisee at the time of the making
of the contract. Such a theory advanced at this time must be
considered a product of present-day imagination, and not a
theory which in reality influenced the makers of the doctrine
of consideration.
But it may be suggested that there was a time, before the
separation between deceit ex delicto and ex contractu was sharp,
when the two were corifused in men's minds. Such, however,
was not the case. For over a hundred years there had been
allegations of assumpsit in trespass on the case, before that
action was applied to cases which in reality were simple breaches
of contract.8 They were actions against ferrymen, surgeons,
farriers, barbers, and carpenters for badly performing work
which they had undertaken to do. It was necessary to allege
the assumpsit, for without it such injuries were not actionable.
Consideration was never an essential allegation in the declaration.
But the instant the action is brought for simple breach of con-
tract "consideration" appears. Why the sudden change?
Obviously the answer lies in the recognized difference in the
two types of cases, one sounding in tort and one in contract.
In the early cases in which assumpsit was allowed the judges
talk of "consideration,"" "causa,"19 and "things done at defend-
ant's request,""1 but never once do they speak of deceit or dam-
ages caused thereby. Consideration was not required in the
cases in which assumpsit had to be laid when the gist of the
action was ex delicto, i. e., those assumpsit cases which preceded
the application of the writ to breaches of contract. It has not
since then been applied to true cases of deceit. But instantly
we find the requirement in the first cases of contract.
There is an instantaneous transformation of the allegations
of damages suffered by reason of deceit to allegations of a
promise given in consideration of something, followed by a
breach which is alleged to be a deceit; an immediate recognition
that the cause of action has an entirely new basis. The words
alleging deceit in the pleadings were retained as a pure fiction,
-and were recognized and treated as such. Judges looked to
other sources for determining what promises were to be action-
'See cases collected by Ames (1888) 2 HARv. L. REv. .
9Smith v. Smith's Case (x584) 3 Leon. 88.
"Anon. (i5O5) Keil. 77, pl. 25.
'Hunt v. Bate (I568) Dyer, 272.
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able and what not, and promptly forgot the origin of the writ
employed.
Nor can any aid for Professor Ames' theory be derived from
the subsequent development of the law. We know that the tort
action of deceit and the contract action of deceit trav-elled
entirely different roads. A true deceit requires the misrepresen-
tation of a fact, an intention that it be acted upon, an act in
reliance upon the misrepresentation and a detriment suffered
therefrom. In assumpsit it is entirely immaterial whether a
person suffers damages in reliance on a promise. If the promise
was without consideration there is no recovery no matter how
great the detrinient. If there is a technical consideration sub-
stantial damages may be obtained even though nothing is lost
because of an act in reliance on the promise.
There is not an element in common between the two unless
it be the detriment from deceit and the consideration required
to make a promise binding. But they do not resemble each
other except most superficially. Both are detriments. That is
all. Suit is brought not to recover the detriment by way of
consideration, but for the breach, and such has always been the
case.
1 2
Professor Ames would have us believe that a fiction became
a reality, not that the allegation of deceit turned contracts into
deceits perhaps, but that the other allegation of damages suffered
in reliance, made consideration a sine qua -non. The principal
allegation, i. e., of deceit, was hardly taken seriously, but the
subsidiary allegation of damages is supposed to have suddenly
been transformed into something very different, a most serious
requirement which had to be proved.
The proposition is most extraordinary and contrary to the
history of fictions. Fictions have, to be sure, played a most
important part in the development of remedies. By means of
them old remedies have been applied to new cases, but perhaps
in all other cases they have been recognized as fictions and by
common consent treated as such. When the Roman provision of
the Twelve Tables, the action de arboribus succisis, was applied
to the cutting of vines, nobody was deceived nor did it give rise
to a doctrine of substantive law. The same may be said of the
common-law fiction by which land owners were allowed to make
use of John Doe and Richard Roe in order that they might avail
themselves of a writ designed for the protection of tenants.
"Slade's Case (i6o2) 4 Coke, 92 b.
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And every other fiction that one can think of has played the
same sort of part until finally abandoned even in form, 13 unless
the fiction in question is an exception.
It is felt that this is treating Professor Ames fairly though he
does not give us the steps by which his deduction is reached. If
all that he meant was that the courts enforced contracts to
prevent the practice of deceit, it would amount to nothing more
than saying that considerations of policy governed, for the prac-
tice could be prevented without making fiction reality; and con-
sideration could never have had its origin in the fiction without
such a process.
What actually took place is simple enough. The use of case
for breach of contract was a clear case of policy, conservatively
exercised.
The situation with which the courts were confronted pre-
sented an exact parallel to the cases where personal property
was sold. In the latter case, if the goods were delivered, the
vendor could bring debt. If they were paid for and not deliv-
ered the purchasers could bring detinue.14 Where land was
bought and paid for as in the cases in which assumpsit was first
brought (and it is most significant that it was first applied to
cases of that type), the purchaser had no remedy corresponding
to detinue. The unpaid vendor could recover in debt. The
purchaser ought clearly to have had a reciprocal right.
The writs for recovery of land were proprietary or posses-
sory. In detinue the plaintiff could get either the goods or
damages. In the real property writs he could get neither in
the principal case. Title had not passed to the plaintiff and the
courts of common law could not give specific performance even
where the vendor still retained the title. Nor could damages
be recovered in the property writs as an alternative to con-
veying the property.
The cases were parallel. There was no reason why there
should be a remedy in one case and not in the other. The
courts of common law had to grant damages, or else see the
cases pass to the chancellor, of whose jurisdiction they were
See Maine, Ancient Law, chap. on Fictions.
"4It is thought that it is better to state the matter in the form of uni-lateral contracts or of bargains performed on one side; for the firstindication of the enforcement in the royal courts of bargains executoryon both sides seems to have been in the very year of the principal case,i. e., z442. Year Book, 2o Hen. VI, 34, 4.
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exceedingly jealous. Such was the real reason for the origin
of assumpsit.
It would be a serious mistake to suppose that the judges who
first allowed assumpsit had any intention of .providing thereby
a general remedy for breach of parol contracts. On the other
hand they were clear-sighted enough to realize that they were
opening the door. Like all good common-law judges they con-
fined themselves to the case in hand and allowed the future to
take care of itself.
It is perfectly obvious that in the absence of a specialty there
was no writ in the register other than trespass on the case suitable
to accomplish the object in view, to wit, to give damages to the
plaintiff who had paid his money for land and had not got the
land. It is equally obvious that the plaintiff should have his
damages, as he could have if the subject matter of the contract
was personal property. The courts gave him damages, allowing
him to employ the fiction that he had been deceived as an excuse
for bringing case. That is the whole story of the origin of
assumpsit.
By way of summary then, it may be said that the employment
of case in the form of deceit was simply and solely a matter of
policy. The allegation in the original writ and in the declaration
of assumpsit charging that the breach of the contract was done
fraudulently was a pure fiction used only for the purpose of
giving color. It was a mere sham, a pretense. The allegation
never had to be proved and was never taken seriously. It was
known to be a fiction and treated as such. There is not a word
in the opinion of the judges to indicate that after it was once
held that assumpsit would lie for breach of contract, they ever
again thought of the origin of the action. There is not a single
case in assumpsit in which the ratio decidendi (not what we
should say was the ratio decidendi, but what the judges them-
selves gave as such) was that a breach of contract was a
deceit. It is then far fetched to suppose that a matter which
was not only not taken seriously, but not even thought of, could
have been responsible for the doctrine of consideration.
II
The origin of the doctrine of consideration may be traced
back to Anglo-Saxon contracts. Both Holmes in The Coi'nnon
Law and Pollock and Maitland in the History of English Law
come close to such conclusion.
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Holmes identified consideration with the quid pro quo of
debt.'1 5 Then taking the quid pro quo as meaning the conferring
of a benefit on the debtor, he defined consideration as a benefit
to the promisor. Such definition has not been considered satis-
factory, for consideration is not always a benefit to the promisor.
The generally accepted definition to-day is that consideration
must consist of a detriment to the promisee, and that is certainly
more accurate and comprehensive than Holmes' definition.
Was Holmes then entirely wrong in his demonstration? It is
submitted that he was not; that consideration in both of its
aspects of benefit to the promisor and detriment to the promisee
may be traced to precedents in the action of debt, and then back
to Anglo-Saxon law. The trouble was that Holmes rejected
material which he need not have rejected and thereby arrived
at a definition which was too narrow, thus discrediting his efforts.
He makes much of the Anglo-Saxon formal contract which he
calls the surety contract. Then he notes that from the time
of Henry II to Edward III the surety could be held in debt on
parol proof.16 After that he rejects the surety cases from con-
sideration on the ground that after Edward III, sureties are held
by writing only.17 In doing that he puts aside the cases which
are responsible for the modem definition of consideration.
Pollock and Maitland had no theory of consideration to
uphold, as the matter was one which did not fall within their
period, but they had it in mind and dwelt at length on the
anilogy of the quid pro quo of debt, seeming thereby to agree
with Holmes as far as he went. They also took note of the
parol surety cases. They, however, did not reject them as hav,
ing no bearing on the doctrine of consideration, but were con-
tent to call attention to them and to point out their origin in the
Anglo-Saxon formal contract of the wed."'
For the origin of the formal contract of the Anglo-Saxons we
must go back to the procedural contract. When in primitive
times a member of one family had killed or injured a member
of another, there was apt to be a feud. If the matter was
settled, it was done by treaty, the terms of which were that the
family of the wrongdoer was to pay a composition to the family
"Holmes, The Common Law, p. 267.
'"Ibid., p. 26o.
'Ibid., p. 264.
'Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, Vol II, p. 2o9.
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of the wronged."9 If there was a dispute as to whether, the
accused had in fact done the wrong the promise was conditioned
on whether the accused could clear himself. He had to stand
trial in that case either by oath or ordeal. If the parties to the
treaty could not agree on the amount of composition payable
by custom, the matter had to be referred to the decision of
the gemot.
The ceremony by which the procedural treaty was entered
into was as follows: The accused handed a wed-it.was usually
a stick, but might be almost any small article-to a representa-
tive of the plaintiff family, and the latter handed it to certain
representative men of the defendant family.2 0
The meaning of the ceremony was this. When a man is cap-
tured by his enemies he is of course disarmed. In the case in
question, the family of the pursued has interfered to prevent
capture. But the spear or weapon of the accused is nevertheless
handed to the pursuers. The latter give it up to the defendant
family in consideration of their promise to pay whatever com-
position turns out to be due by folk custom. Because of the
promise the pursuit is given up and the peace preserved.
The effect of the pact is to put the pursued into the power
of certain members of his own family. The men of the defend-
.ant family into whose power he is placed became his sureties.
Their obligations were quite similar to those of bail to-day, in
fact our bail is directly descended from the Anglo-Saxon pro-
cedural suretyship.
The formal contract of the Anglo-Saxons was merely an
adaptation of the procedural contract to commercial purposes.
In the case of assault, battery, or homicide, the contract was
obtained by pressure and was the price of peace. In the case
of theft, the owner laid claim to the article in question and the
party in possession either had to give it up or give sureties to
make his defense.2 ' In the case of contracts which were chiefly
if not entirely confined to sales and loans, the sureties were
provided at the time of entering into the contract. The wed
ceremony was employed to make the contract binding. It was
"=For an interesting description of the negotiations leading up to the
treaty, see Laws of Edmund II, 7.
"Wigmore (1896) io HARv. L. REv. 324, note.
'Laughlin, The Anglo-Saxon Procedure, Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law,
p. 202 ff.
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then the business of the sureties to see that it was performed,
and to produce the debtor to make defence if there was a
dispute as .to whether it had been performed or not. If the
debtor did not perform it was the duty of the sureties to do
so. In fact the contract had what to us may seem a peculiarity,
in that the debtor was not bound. The sureties only were obli-
gated to the creditor.22 The debtor's obligation was to the
sureties only, by virtue of being in their power. That gave them
control over his person and property, and enabled them to com-
pel him to pay, or to apply the property themselves as far as it
would go tp the payment of the debt, and to obtain reimbursement
in case they themselves had to pay in the first instance.
This formal, or surety contract, was used for all sorts of pur-
poses. In fact it was the most general mode of contracting
employed by the Anglo-Saxons.
23
But before the close of the Anglo-Saxon period a modification
of the forial contract had come into use. By some it has been
called "real," but that introduces Roman ideas and a wrong
impression. It may better be called the "delivery-promise."
When A sold and delivered goods to B and did not get the price,
or loaned B money, the obligation of B to pay could be made
actionable without there being sureties. What took place was
this. The delivery of the goods or the money loaned was made
formally and before witnesses. At the same time B promised
to .pay. The only difference between these transactions and
similar ones entered into by the wed ceremony was the omission
of part of the ceremony and the absence of sureties. The other
essentials, formal delivery, formal promise, and witnesses, were
present.2 ' The reason, it is submitted, that the sureties could
be omitted in the later Anglo-Saxon law is that the state had
made provision for compelling every man to provide himself
with sureties in advance, to hold him to answer any claim which
might be made upon him. 25 The sureties not being present
there would of course be no meaning in employing a wed which
was for the express purpose of putting the debtor into the power
of sureties.
-"Wigmore (i8W6) Io HAuV. L. RZEV. 328.
'Laughlin, The Anglo-Saxon Legal Procedure, Essays in Anglo-Saxon
Law, p. igo.
" Schmidt, Anhang X, XI; see p. 679, infra.
I Ethelred I, x.
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Not that it is likely that the wed was quickly dispensed with.
It had come to be looked upon as necessary to bind an agree-
ment. The probabilities are that for a long time, after sureties
had ceased to be a necessity, a wed was given to the party to be
bound. Centuries later in the bilateral bargain, or "earnest"
contract, the wed was still used to bind the bargain. So in
addition to delivering the goods, the creditor perhaps handed
the debtor a stick as a wed.
28  But after a time the futility of
such a proceeding must have been seen, and the goods delivered
then came to be looked upon as themselves constituting a suf-
ficient wed.
That the term "delivery-promise" gives an accurate impres-
sion of the transaction may be seen from the analysis given.
That such analysis is correct is shown by the procedure.
The plaintiff opened by the oath v
"Anhang X. In the name of the living God, as I
money demand, so have I lack of that which N. promised
me when I mine to him sold."
The defendant's plea was:
"Anhang XI. In the name of the living God, I owe
not to N. 'sceatt' or shilling, or penny or penny's worth;
but I have discharged to him all that I owed him, so far
as our verbal contracts were at first."
The plaintiff's witness swore:
"Anhang VIII. In the name of Almighty God, 
as I
here for N. in true witness stand, unbidden and unbrought,
so I with my eyes saw, and with my ears heard, that
which I with him say."
2
Note that what was said, the promise was quite as important
as what was seen, the delivery.
There were then in Anglo-Saxon times two forms of contract
in general use.28  One of them was the surety contract. In that
"That was done when livery of seisin was made of land. Pollock and
Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, Vol. II, p. 83. And the probabilities are strong
that the same was done in chattel transfers.
I Schmidt, Anhang X, XI, VIII.
"There were a number of others also, but for our purposes, they need
not be considered.
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the essence of the matter was that the promisee had suffered
a detriment at the request of the promisor. In the sale or loan
the promisee has parted with property to the debtor, if he may
be so called when under no direct legal obligation to the creditor,
at the request of the surety. In the older procedural contract
the promisee has given up his right to take revenge on the
pursued, at the request of the surety-promisors. In the newer
or "delivery-promise," the promisor always received a benefit,
the goods or money which were delivered to him at the time
he made his promise.
It would, of course, be absurd to contend that the Anglo-
Saxons looked for a detriment to the promisee, or a benefit to
the promisor, as a test of the actionability of a contract. What
counted with them was the form and the sanctions behind the
form. In the earliest times when the state was Weak, the essen-
tial thing was to have sureties to see to the performance of the
contract. Later, when sureties were not necessary for each con-
tract, because required by law to hold persons to every justice,
the form still continued to be a sine qua non. The point is
simply this, that the substance of the matter was precisely as
indicated, i. e., the only promises which were actionable were in
transactions in which the promisor had received a benefit, or in
which the promisee had suffered a detriment, not that such
phenomena alone made them actionable.
When we come to the age of Glanvil we find the same situa-
tion. He gives us two forms of the writ of debt. One ran
against a surety, and the other against the debtor himself. The
second is too familiar to require quoting. The first ran as
follows:
"The King to the. Sheriff, greeting. Command N. that
justly and withQut delay he acquit R. of a hundred marks
against N. for which he made himself surety to him, as
he says, and whereof he complains that he has not
acquitted him thereof, and unless he do so summon him
by good summons, etc."
29
There can be no question that the surety's obligation was
incurred by a surety contract of the Anglo-Saxon type. It pos-
sesses exactly the same characteristics. The surety's obligation
is not collateral but primary. It is the surety and not the debtor
who is liable. The debtor cannot be sued where there is a
"Glanvil, Book X, chap. 4.
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surety." That of course is precisely what we should expect.
The king's courts, or Glanvil, did not invent contracts. They
adopted the customary Anglo-Saxon law. Up to the time of
Glanvil also there had been no opportunity to develop a com-
mon law of contracts. There were no cases of debt in the
king's court before Henry H1,31 and the contract cases in that
reign were few and far between. They can be counted on one's
fingers.
Every contract mentioned by Glanvil other than surety con-
tracts were of the benefit to the debtor-defendant variety. They
were confined to sales and loans in which there had been a
delivery on one side.82 Also the same methods of proof were
employed. Unless there was a charter the plaintiff had to make
deraignment by transaction witnesses.33 The witnesses testified
to what they saw and heard, to the formal delivery, and to the
promise made by the party upon receiving the property.
3 '
In the reign of Henry II, therefore, all actionable debts were
confined to cases in which there had been a detriment to the
promisee, i. e., in the surety cases, or a benefit to the debtor-
defendant in the other cases.
Then coming to the reign of Edward I we may quote Poll6ck
and Maitland. They tell us that the five common cases in which
debt was brought were (i) for money lent, (2) for rent on
leases, (3) for goods sold and delivered, (4) against sureties,
and (5) for a fixed sum on a sealed document3 5 We see only
one new class of cases since Glanvil, thoge in which debt was
brought for the recovery of rent on leases. Leaving the written
contract out of consideration, in three out of the other four
classes the debtor-defendant had received a benefit. In the
fourth the promisee had suffered a detriment at the request of
the surety-promisor.
Such was the state of contract law at least up to the reign of
Glanvil, Book X, chap. 3.
"The few cases indexed under debt by Bigelow, Placita Anglo-Nor-
manica, seem not to be debt cases.
'Except the bilateral bargain which was still unfledged, or the unac-
tionable fides facta. Glanvil, B6ok X, chap. 12 and chap. i4._
IGlanvil, Book X, chap. i2. Duel was also mentioned, but it is doubt-
ful whether it was ever actually used in debt.
" Glanvil, Book X, chap. x8. Note that private contracts, those not made
before witnesses, were not actionable.
" Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, VoL II, p. 2o.
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Edward III. As late as 1314 A. D., we find a surety held by
parol in an action of debt.38
Let us summarize up to this point. We start with the pro-
cedural contract which goes back to the beginning of things
legal. In the Anglo-Saxon records it is first referred to in the
laws of Hlothaere and Eadric. 7 It must have been in use at
least as far back as our earliest recorded laws, those of Aethel-
birt, which date from 6oi-6o4 A. D. A non-procedural bargain
is discussed in those laws, which must have been sanctioned by
the wed ceremony. 8 And the wed contract is prescribed by
the laws of Hlothaere and Eadric for binding a curator or
depositee who was to keep the goods of a minor until he became
of age."'
The surety contract then, entered into by the wed ceremony,
was in use throughout the Anglo-Saxon period from 6oi A. D.
on. It continued in common use through the ages of Henry
II and Edward I, and at least up to 1314 A. D., i. e., to just
before Edward III.
For seven hundred years then, prior to 1314 A. D., sureties
were bound by their promises made by parol. The surety had
received no benefit from the promisee, but the promisee had
always suffered a detriment in reliance on the surety's promise,
or at the request of the surety. In the procedural contract used
in composition claims the pursuant had given up his right to take
revenge in consideration of the promise of the sureties to pay
whatever customary composition should appear to be due. In
the surety contract used for commercial purposes the creditor
had always given up property in exchange for the surety's
promise to pay.
It is probably true that the wed ceremony continued to be
used throughout the period. There are indications that the use
of the ceremony to bind sureties and the holding of sureties
alone on parol promises came to an eihd about the same time.'0
It was then the ceremony which in the popular mind had the
binding effect. But the substance of the transaction was pre-
cisely as described. At a later time after the ceremony had
become obsolete we ought not to be surprised to see the courts
" Year Book, 7 Edw. II, f. 242.
"HIoth. & Ead. 8-io.
"Aethelbirt, 77; cf. Edmund I, 1-7.
Hloth. & Ead. 6.
See p. 688, infra.
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hold a surety on a parol promise without its having been accom-
panied by the delivery of a wed. The substance of the transac-
tion being the same as those which for so many centuries had
been taken cognizance of by courts, they could hardly be accused
of a radical departure from precedent when in assumpsit they
held the surety. Rather it was, it is submitted, a picking up of
the thread of a very ancient line of precedents.
As to the "delivery-promise," on which the debtor himself,
the party who had received the goods, was held, it is hard to
say just when that developed, probably about 9oo A. D. And
it was, no doubt, sometime after that before it freed itself from
the necessity of being accompanied by the wed ceremony. At
any rate it was full grown in the time of Henry II, and Edward
I. Up to 1314 A. D., it had perhaps 4oo years of history
behind it.
If we were to look at "delivery-promise" cases only and to
generalize from them, we should be inclined to say that the
substance of the transaction was that the promisor had received
a benefit for his promise.
But if the quid pro quo doctrine had been formulated before
1314 A. D., to include all actionable parol contracts it would
have had to be stated the other way around. We should have
aaid that the promisee must have given something for the prom-
ise and we should have had the modem definition of considera-
tion. That would seem a perfectly legitimate conception of the
quid pro quo. But unfortunately such was not the case. That
doctrine was formulated later, at a time when parol surety cases
were not coming before the courts, and it must be admitted that
the benefit aspect was more looked at than the detriment aspect.
At a still later date, after assumpsit had come in, there can be
no question that the courts conceived of the quid pro quo in
debt as a benefit conferred on the debtor.' For that reason
no attempt will here be made to insist on defining the quid pro
quo as a detriment suffered by the promisee. If that could
have been done, a complete identification of consideration and
quid pro quo would have been possible. We could have said
Holmes was absolutely right in identifying the two. He was
wrong only in his definition of the quid pro quo, and consequently
also in his definition of consideration. But it is realized that
4Baxter v. Read (i585) 3 Dyer, 272 b; Sidenham v. Worlington'Ws Case
(x585) 2 Leon. 224.
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the quid pro quo acquired, such a meaning that a use of the term
to describe a detriment to the promisee would hardly do.
However, we can say in conclusion that before 1314 A. D.
in every actionable debt the debtor-defendant had received d
benefit, or the promisee had suffered a detriment at the request
of the surety-promisor, which is just about the definition of
consideration commonly given by modern courts.42
What happened after 1314 A. D.? Holmes makes the state-
ment that by the reign of Edward III the parol surety contract
ceased to be actionable; that a writing was thereafter required
to charge the surety.'8 If all that he meant by the statements
was that parol surety contracts were becoming obsolete, and
that for two centuries, an example of a surety being sued alone
and held on a parol promise was not to be found in the king's
courts, no exception would here be taken to the remark. But
there does not appear to have been a decision holding that a
surety could no longer be held by parol in an action of debt.
And the obsolescence of parol surety promises may be explained
on other grounds than a determination on the part of the courts
not to enforce them.
If the disappearance of suits against sureties on parol promises
was the result of a conscious effort on the part of the courts,
a determination to restrict the recovery on parol debts to those
in which the defendant had received a benefit, it would be signif-
icant. If, on the other hand, it was due to entirely different-
causes, to a change in business usage, as, it is here submitted, it
was, and not to a change of policy on the part of the courts,
there was then no change in tridition.
First, what do the cases actually hold? The first cited by
Holmes was in I344 A. D." In that case there was a quaere as
to whether there should be a specialty to charge a surety. The
other case on which he relies was in 136o A. D.15 In that case
it was argued that the defendant surety could not be held
because there was no specialty, but the case was decided on
another ground. A third party had borrowed ioo shillings of
the plaintiff. The defendant said that if the plaintiff would
grant time until the following Michaelmas, that he, the defend-
' Cf. Currie v. Misa (z875) L. R. io Ex. x53, 62.
'Holmes, The Common Law, pp. 261, 264.
Year Book, 18 Edw. III, 13, pl 7.
Year Book, 44 Edw. II, 21, pl. 23.
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ant, would pay. It was held that the defendant was not liable
because by the defendant's undertaking the debtor was still
bound as he formerly was. In other words the creditor had
suffered no detriment, for he had given up no right against the
original debtor. The inference therefore, it is submitted, to be
drawn from the case is just the opposite from that which Holmes
draws: to wit, that a surety could be held by parol, provided
there was something given for his promise.
Holmes cites no cases which hold that a parol surety promise
was not actionable, and it is believed that there are no such
cases to be found between Edward III and the time assumpsit
got under way."8
What then do the cases show affirmatively in favor of the
contrary proposition, i. e., that the parol surety could be held in
debt after 1314 A. D.? There was another case decided about
the same date as that last cited which recognizes that the surety
could be held by parol,' 7 but as it was asserted in the argument,
in reply to the remark by defendant's counsel that the action
was not maintainable without a specialty, that by the custom of
London parol proof was good, the force of the case is weakened.
And as Fitz-Herbert, in his New Natura Brevium, in making the
statement that debt would lie by parol against a surety, relies on
the above case, the matter is hardly proved. Yet it does mean
much that a man of the legal attainments of Fitz-Herbert should
be of the opinion in 1534 A. D. that debt did lie in such a case.
His words were:
"And a man shall have an action of debt against him
who becometh pledge for another upon his promise to
pay the money, without any writing made thereof; quod
vide in title de Pleg. acquietand, p. 43 Edw. III, 11."418
As late as i459 A. D.,4 9 it was said:
"If I say to a surgeon, if he will go to one J. who is sick,
and will give him medicine, and make him well, he shall
have ioo shillings. Then if the said surgeon goes to J.
and gives him medicine and cures him, he would have
a good action of debt against me, although the thing was
done for another and not for me."
"An extended search .has failed to reveal such a case.
Year Book, 43 Edw. III, f. ii.
"Fitz-Herbert, New Naura Brevium, 12 K. Italics are the author's.
Year Book, 37 Hen. VI, 8, 18.
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The dictum is clear that a parol surety promise was actionable,
unless it be suggested that in the case described the defendant
would become the principal debtor and not a surety. But any
distinction based on the difference between a principal and a
collateral debt was a thing of the future, and not applicable.
It was entirely immaterial whether the person cured by the sur-
geon was also liable or not, for it has been seen thift in the early
law the rule was that the surety was liable, and the debtor was
not.5 0
To come back to the case in 1459 A. D.51 The facts of that
case were as follows: Debt was brought on a parol agreement
by which the plaintiff promised that he would marry the defend-
ant's daughter, and the defendant was to pay the plaintiff ioO
marks. The betrothal ceremony was celebrated, but the mar-
riage did not take place. It was contended that the case was
similar to that in which there had been a bargain for the sale
of land. In that case it had been held that debt would lie,
although livery of seisin had not taken place. In the principal
case it was said the plaintiff was bound to carry out the marriage
and that he had therefore suffered a detriment.52 But it was
answered that that was a matter for the Courts Christian; that
the lay courts could not compel marriage.
In another connection attention has been called to the case,58
in which it was said a man who had promised to be a surety
could not be held because the promisee had given up no right
agAinst the debtor.
There are then at least dicta between 1314 A. D. and 1520
A. D., to the effect that a surety might be held alone on a parol
promise. And it is by no means certain that if a parol surety
case had come before the courts they would not have held the
surety. It seems most probable that they would have held him.
The refusal by the courts to longer examine the secta, or suit,'
would not mean that a case could not be proved against a surety
by parol. It did mean that the wed ceremony to bind sureties
had become obsolete, but sureties could no doubt be held as
principal debtors under the "delivery-promise" contract.55 In
See pp. 677-678, supra.
" Year Book, 37 Hen. VI, 8, p. 18,
' Cf. Holmes, The Common Law, p. 269.
"' Year Book, 44 Edw. III, 21, pl. 23; see p. 684, supra.
"See p. 688,. infra.
' That was what was done in Year Book, i8 Edw. III, p1. 7, p. 22.
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such a case, we may say, if we will, that the debtor is not a
surety. But it should be kept in mind that the mere fact that
no one else was bound to the creditor did not prevent the person
who was bound from being a surety. In the early law the surety
only was bound and the debtor was not.
It may well be that some of the cases which appear to be
against debtors were in fact against sureties. There would be
no difference between them as far as the creditor was concerned.
If he was to hold one only it might be either the person to whom
the money or goods was to be delivered, or the person at whose
request they were to be delivered.
It is, however, natural to expect to see attempts soon made to
hold both the debtor and the surety on "delivery-promises."
That could be accomplished by means of the joint promise.5 6
When we see joint debtors we know that generally as between
themselves some are sureties. The one quid pro quo would in
such cases serve to bind both debtor and surety.
The practice, if once established, of binding a surety alone
by making the delivery of the goods to the surety would, by
showing that the wed ceremony was not necessary, tend to make
such ceremony obsolete. Even more so would a discovery that
if the goods were delivered to both jointly and their joint
promises taken, both surety and debtor could be held.
The chief factor in doing away with the wed to bind sureties
was the increasing use of seals and writing. By the reign of
Edward III the written contract had become common. If a
transaction was of sufficient importance for a surety to be
demanded the only prudent course for the creditor to take was
to get the surety's promise under seal. The advantages of such
a course were great. First, wager of law was a defense in debt
when proof was by parol, while it was not to a sealed instru-
ment. Second, a writing was easier to prove. The wed cere-
mony had to be proved by a transaction witness. Third, if the
wed was used, only the surety could be held and not the debtor.
And in the fourth place by the obligation under seal the parties
could be held severally as well as jointly, which was perhaps
not the case if the "delivery-promise" were used.57
Year Book, 6 Edw. IV, 24, nota I. See also Sir Matthewv Hale's note
to Fitz-Herbert's, New Natura Brevium, I37 D.
' There is a case which seems to indicate that one of the parties could
be held by parol, and the other on a specialty, Year Book, 28 Hen. VI, 4.
In that case, which was in x45o A. D., a prisoner in the Tower was sued
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It is quite natural to see the practice continue of creditors
trusting in parol promises of debtors in spite of such disadvan-
tages, in small matters or in larger where complete trust was
placed in the debtors. We, therefore, see cases in courts in
which the trust failed and in which the defendant did wage his
law. But when a creditor was sufficiently cautious to require a
surety, he would naturally also take the precaution to get the
surety's promise in writing and under seal.
We should then expect to see the wed ceremony, in its use to
bind sureties, become obsolete, and that is evidently what took
place. An indication that it did was the disappearance about
the time of Edward III of the Anglo-Saxon transaction witness,
shown by the courts ceasing to examine the secta or suit in
contract cases.
58
The surety contract entered into by the wed ceremony, and
binding the surety only, disappears; and we should not expect
to see sureties as such sued alone by parol between 1314 A. D.
and I52O A. D. It is not at all strange then that a clear case
holding the surety in such a way has not been found. But it
seems that the change was due to no change in the law, but
merely to such changes in business usage as have been indicated.
If then it is admitted that the surety contract between Edward
III and Henry VI was on the one hand merged with the contract
in writing and under seal, and on the other with the "delivery-
promise," or "real" contract, was not Holmes' deduction after
all correct?
Is not the mere absence of parol surety promises from the
courts for about 2oo years itself sufficient to break the con-
tinuity? Even if it does appear in I52O A. D.,59 that in an
action of assumpsit a surety can be held on a parol promise,
how can such a case be connected with cases between 6oi A. D.
and 1314 A. D., which held the surety on parol promises?
It is believed that the fact alone that the courts did take up
the thread is sufficient of itself to show that the old precedents
in debt by parol for food and drink. It was held to be no defense to show
that a stranger had made an obligation, i. e., a specialty, for the same
claim. It had shortly before been held that an obligation if made by
the debtor himself was a defense to debt on a parol cbntract; Year Book,
22 Hen. VI, 56.
Year Book, 2o Edw. I, f. 307; Year Book, 17 Edw. III, f. 72; Year
Book (7th. ed.) II, 242.
" Year Book, 12 Hen. VIII, q. ii, pl. 3.
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were not forgotten. That fact coupled with dicta during the
intervening period showing that the courts continued to think
of the detriment aspect of the matter, 60 makes a good case in
itself.
But it is possible to go farther. The fact that a line of cases
seems for a while to have merged itself in another, or in two
others in this instance, does not necessarily show that it has lost
its characteristics, especially when at a later time it emerges
unchanged.
First, did the practice of using sealed instruments to bind
sureties, instead of the wed ceremony, entirely change the nature
of the transaction?
At a later date men came to look upon the sealed contract as a
special kind of contract, but we cannot be too cautious about
applying later conceptions to earlier facts. For centuries the
writing, and then the writing under seal, was merely a method
of proof. Pollock and Maitland say:
"We may doubt whether in the thirteenth century a
purely gratuitous promise, though made in a sealed instru-
ment, would have been enforced if its gratuitous charac-
ter had stood openly revealed." 61
The feeling and practice of requiring something in exchange
for a thing or a promise goes back to the beginning of things
legal, and was so deep rooted that it could not easily be shaken.
It is true that if a man confessed a debt under seal he could
not afterwards deny it. He could not contradict his confession
by showing there was no quid pro quo. Thus a practical means
was at hand for binding a man without a quid pro quo. But
it may have been centuries, perhaps not until after the doctrine
of consideration in assumpsit was coming to be formulated,
before either theory or practice changed. As a matter of fact
in almost every case in which a surety was held by specialty
the promisee had parted with something at the request of the
surety, and the specialty was merely regarded as a confession
of the debt.
Why then should surety cases when -proof was made by spe-
cialty be regarded in a light substantially different from those
in which proof had been made by parol? Neither- the transac-
tions nor the tradition had changed.
" See cases pp. 685-687, supra.
'Hist. Eng. Law, Vol. II, pp. 210, 21i.
$'
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Again does the merging, for a while, of the surety and
the "real" contract, by the binding of the surety jointly with the
debtor, or singly as a "principal debtor," mean the loss of the
tradition that, stripped of the wed ceremony, the substance of
the matter between creditor and surety was that the former
had suffered something or done something or given something
at the request of the latter?
In this connection attention must be given to the theory that
the action of debt was "proprietary" and that the contracts
which it enforced were "real." It is believed that an over em-
phasis of this matter has done much to obscure the true nature
of the contracts of the period.
In what sense was debt "proprietary"?
(a) Certainly not in the sense that a libel in admiralty is
"real," or that the old writs for the recovery of land were
proprietary. The thing claimed was not the defendant. The
defendant in debt was always a person.
(b) Certainly not in the sense that the action of ejectment
was "proprietary," for the title to a thing was never tried
in debt, whereas it was incidentally in ejectment.
(c) Certainly not in the sense that actions for the protec-
tion of rights in rem might be called "proprietary," for debt
could never be brought against a stranger for interference with
the plaintiff's rights. It lay only against a person who had
received property from the plaintiff by contract or who had
made a promise to the plaintiff.
In fact debt in the debet was conceived of as more personal
than our contract actions to-day. When it was brought against
a personal representative it was not correct to use the word
debet. That word was proper only where both parties to the
transaction were alive. If either died there was no longer any
"owing." The money was said to be unlawfully detained.6 2
(d) Certainly not in the sense that replevin is proprietary,
that the thing or money demanded could be specifically recovered.
Even in detinue, which branched off from debt, the defendant
always had his option of delivering the thing, or damages in its
place.
On what basis then could debt be called "proprietary"?
Apparently on the following grounds:
(a) The original writ of debt looked like the writ of right,
which latter was admittedly proprietary;
Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng Law, Vol. II, p. 2o5.
CONSIDERATION IN CONTRACTS
(b) It had some of the same characteristics, e. g., deraign-
ment by battle, and defense by wager of law.
(c) The plaintiff in all the early cases in debt may plausibly
be supposed by us to have thought he was demanding the
return of his own," though he ought to have known well enough
that he could not get his own through the courts;
(d) In the early cases a res had been given by the plaintiff,
and his right is therefore supposed to be based on a "real" con-
tract.
Let us briefly analyze these propositions.
(a) First, what of the original writ of debt which Glanvil
gives us? It looks as much like the writ of right as two peas
in a pod. But these things should be noted. First, the other
form of the writ of debt which Glanvil gives us should not be
overlooked,64 that is, the one directed against the surety-promisor.
It does not resemble the writ of right in the least. Second, the
most important word on which the theory of identity in the char-
acter of the two actions is based, i. e., "deforces," was almost
immediately struck out, almost before it had been used in that
form, and the word "detains" substituted.
6 5 Third, the writ
of debt covered exactly the same field as was covered by the
Anglo-Saxon contract procedure, which was clearly promissory
and not "real."6 6  May it not be that the original resemblance
between the two writs was simply due to the tendency of a
scribe to copy, and that the most incongruous part of the copy-
ing was soon struck out?
(b) As to the resemblances of proof in debt and the writ
of right, the explanation is simple enough. They both originated
about the same time, when the only methods of proof then in
use were of course applied to them. Glanvil does give us battle
as a method of proof in debt But Pollock and Maitland tell us:
"The offer of battle in proof of debt vanishes so early
that we are unable to give any one instance in which it
was made."6 61
Battle was only appropriate for a "real" action, and may not
Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, Vol. II, p. 2o8.
Glanvil, Book X, chap. 7; given in full, pp. 678-679, supra.
" Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, Vol. II, p. 212.
"Laughlin, The Anglo-Saxon Legal Procedure, Essays in Anglo-Saxon
Law, p. 197 ff.
"A Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, Vol. II, p. 22.
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the explanation of Glanvil's speaking of it be simply that he was
suggesting a method of proof for new situations for which there
were no precedents? He appears by no means sure of himself
in some instances in which he mentioned trial by battle in connec-
tion with contracts.6 7 The probabilities are that trial by battle
was never used in an action of debt. As to wager of law, that
was the customary defense to claims on promises and had been
for many centuries.
(c) As to the supposed thought on the part of plaintiffs in
suing in debt that they were only claiming their own, it may
be said that, in spite of our assumed superiority of powers of
analysis over our ancestors, it hardly seems probable. In an
action on a commodatum, a loan for use, the lender naturally
claims his own. But such suits must have been very rare indeed.
They are rare with us to-day. In an action on *a mtutuum, a
loan for consumption, such as a money loan, it is quite possible
that plaintiffs conceived that they were demanding a return of
their own, although if they had stopped to think about the
matter, they were quite as capable as we are to-day of realizing
that they were not going to get back the coins they loaned. But
that is about as far as we can go. In the case of a sale, delivery
was essential in the early law to pass title.6 So even when the
object bought was specific the purchaser who had paid in advance
could not have conceived of it as his own, much less could the
unpaid vendor suppose that the unpaid purchase price was
already his. We are still before the age of consensual contracts,
and also the passing of title by consent alone, without a delivery.
Then, when we come to the surety's obligation, it would seem
quite too much to suppose that the creditor thought he was
demanding his own from the surety.
(d) As to the "real" character of the contract, such a term
imported from the Roman law can do no good and much harm.
It happened thbat the only contracts our Anglo-Saxon ancestors
used were the sale and the loan, in both of which a thing was
given by the creditor to the debtor. We may call the transac-
tion "real" if we will, but we should remember that this only
means that the delivery of a res was a characteristic part of the
transaction. It does not mean that it was the delivery of the
thing alone which created the duty to return or to pay. The
' See Glanvil, Book X, chap. 5.
"MPollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, Vol. II, p. i79.
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promise was quite as essential. The transaction witnesses testi-
fied not only to what they saw, but also to what they heard.69
And when we come to the surety contract, only by a great
stretching can that be called "real." We would have to keep
our eyes fixed on the creditor and say that it matters not whether
he delivers the res to the promisor or to some third party.
Then we should remember that there was no break in contract
law with the advent of debt in the king's courts, that precisely
the same transactions were actionable in debt as by the cus-
tomary law. We have the same "delivery-promises" in sales
and loans, and we have the same parol surety promises, at least
until 1314 A. D. So the use of the term "real" as applied to
contracts of the day must be understood in a very special sense,
meaning nothing more th'an that the plaintiff must have given
something in return for the defendant's promise.
Then how can Pollock and Maitland's statement that debt was
"proprietary"70  be reconciled with their theory that the law
did not recognize property in chattels? They say of an owner
of a chattel:
"If he bails it to another, at all events if he bails it on
terms that deprive him o f the power to reclaim it at will,
he abandons every sort, and kind of seisin." "We may
call him owner or say that the thing belongs to him, but
our old fashioned law treats him very much as if he had
no 'real' right and no more than the benefit of a con-
tract."
7 1
There was no "real" action for the recovery of movables they
say.7 2 But the action of debt which included detinue and which
was at first the only action by which movables could be recovered
was said to be proprietary. There was no property in chattels
loaned or in chattels purchased but not delivered, but there was
in money loaned, or in money demanded as the price of goods
sold in an action of debt. Detinue which grew out of debt was
"non-proprietary," but the parent action was "proprietary."
That hardly seems reasonable.
The promise in all of the debt transactions was just as much
a fact as the delivery. It was not a case of a delivery as such
"Laughlin, The Anglo-Saxon Legal Procedure, Essays in Anglo-Saxon
Law, p. 187; Ethelred IV, 4.




raising a duty to redeliver or to pay. There was no obligation
implied in law, nor was it implied in fact. The promise was
express. The party who had performed did not sue for so much
as his property was worth. If the transaction was a sale he
sued for the express price which the purchaser agreed to pay.
If the transaction was a loan, it was the promise to return an
equal amount which created the debt. If money or property
was delivered without such a promise, it was an executed gift.
Not that the defendant had to use the express word "promise,"
but what counted was what was actually agreed upon at the
time, the words that the witnesses heard; just as what they saw
counted, i. t., the quid pro quo which the promisee delivered in
their presence in exchange for the promise.
It is not at all to be wondered at that the brief original writ
should mention only the debt, without stating either the delivery
or the promise, nor that the declaration which amplified the
plaintiff's claim should be content in describing the way the
debt arose to say that it arose out of a certain described sale
or a loan, without analyzing the elements of those well known
transactions."
To say then that the writ of debt was "proprietary" and
that the contracts which it enforced were "real" simply leads
to confusion of thought. It would be quite as correct to say
that both writ and contract were "promissory." But that also
might be misleading. It is believed that a more accurate way of
stating the matter is that the writ of debt was "personal" and
the contracts which it enforced were formal. Then it may be
explained that the formalities might be any one of three kinds:
(a) a writing which after a time was required to be sealed; (b)
a wed ceremony which bound the surety; and (c) a delivery
by one party, and words of promise by the other made at the
time of the delivery, the res being parted with in exchange for
the promise.
It is submitted then, that the merging in the fourteenth cen-
tury of the surety contract, on the one hand with the contract
under seal and on the other with the "delivery-promise," did
not break tradition. In the first case, the contract was in sub-
stance the same whether proved by writing or by parol. In the
second case, there was also no change in substance, for the
essence of both surety promise and "delivery promise" was
that the promisee had given something for the promise.
" Cf. Fitz-Herbert, New Natura Brevium, p. xig.
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In short, the philosophy and policy behind the doctrine of con-
sideration goes back to the beginning of things legal without
a break. On the one hand, in its simplest form it is a feeling
that gratuitous promises ought not to be enforced. Pollock and
Maitland say:
"We may take it as a general principle of ancient Ger-
man law that the courts will not undertake to uphold
gratuitous gifts or to enforce gratuitous promises."7 4
On the other hand, the courts will enforce promises in well
known and customary transactions.
"They proceed outwards from a type such as the loan
of money; they admit one causa debend7 5 after another,
until at last they have to face the task of generalization.
Still it is believed that all along there is a strong feeling
that, whatever promises the law may enforce, purely
gratuitous promises are not and ought not to be enforce-
able."7 6
When, then, an action of assumpsit was brought in 152o A. D.
against a surety where the promise was by parol, no struggle
was necessary for the courts to hold the surety liable.77 The
surety always had been held from the beginning of legal time.
For many centuries it .had been by a special form of contract
which was no longer used. But there is no reason to suppose
that the tradition was forgotten that parol surety promises were
binding. There were enough precedents recorded in the books
to refresh the memory. True, for a long time the writ of debt
seemed to have narrowed its scope. Sureties had been held
either by specialty or as other debtors in the "delivery-promise,"
and for some time no case against a surety alone by parol had
been brought in the king's courts. But what of that? The
binding of sureties was a well known business transaction of
great antiquity. It was entirely in accord with the principle of
limitation that gratuitous promises should not be enforced. Even
if it were true that through lack of use or by the going out of
"Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, Vol. II, p. 211.
"'That phrase used by Glanvil is borrowed from the Roman law and
tends to obscure the real nature of the contracts of the day. If it were
translated as "customary business transaction" it could be squared with
the facts.
"Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, Vol. II, p. 212.
' Year Book, 12 Hen. VIII, q. II, pl. 3.
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use of the wed ceremony the ability to hold sureties by parol
in debt had been lost, that was no reason for refusing to allow
the newly invented writ of assumpsit to lie in such a case.
The new writ had been applied to one case in which debt did
not lie, that in which a man had purchased and paid for land
and had not received his conveyance.7 8  In such a situation
damages were of course the only possible remedy for a court of
law to give, and in order not to let the matter go without a
remedy and pass entirely into the growing jurisdiction of the
chancellor of which the courts of law were jealous, it was neces-
sary to use the action on the case in the form of deceit to
accomplish the desired result, for debt would not lie for unliqui-
dated damages.
So when the case of a surety who had promised by parol came
before a court of law, they allowed assumpsit to lie; for they had
a feeling that if they did not, another matter would pass out of
the jurisdiction of the law courts into that of equity.
The case which first held a surety in assumpsit is worth
noticing.7 1, Case was brought in the King's Bench against the
executors of J. S. It was
"counted that one J. N. came to the house of the plain-
tiff to buy certain goods, and the said J. S., the testator,
came with him, and when the said J. N. wished to buy,
the plaintiff said he was in doubt about payment, and
the said J. S., the testator, said to him, 'if he, J. N., does
not pay you, I will pay you,' upon which promise the
plaintiff delivered the goods to the said J. N. And the
said J. N. was unable to pay the plaintiff, and later the said
J. S. died, and the plaintiff says that he left sufficient
assets to his executors to pay all his debts and legacies,
and to satisfy him [plaintiff] also; and the question was
whether he should have the action against the executors
or not. And it was adjudged by all the justices that he
should recover in the action for two reasons: for this,
that he had no other remedy at common law except in
this action; the other because the plaintiff, in reliance
on the promise of the testator had delivered the goods,
and there is no reason why his soul should be in jeopardy
when he had sufficient to pay .... ...... Quaere, if
the testator were alive if he could have this action against
him, or if he could wage his law in this case."791
Year Book, 2o Hen. VI, 34, pl. 4; Pp. 666-67o, supra.
"a Year Book (1520) 12 Hen. VIII, q. ii, pl. 3.
' The above is in substance a translation of the case as reported.
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The important step had already been taken in allowing case
to be brought for breach of contract, although, as has already
been pointed out, 0 the step was in some respects not a: big one;
for in the first case to which the writ was applied it amounted
merely to giving a remedy on a contract in which the subject
matter was land, where for a long time there had been a remedy
in detinue where the subject matter was personal property.
The application of the new writ of assumpsit to the parol
surety case seems to have been made without effort, though
the circumstances of the case in which it took place are not
without interest. The fact that the testator in all probability
would have paid the debt, and that for the good of his soul
it ought now to be paid, seems to have had some weight. But
the simple truth is that the holding was not felt to be a sub-
stantial innovation, though the language of the case indicates
at least a doubt whether there was any remedy at law unless case
would lie.
Of the suretyship case, the translation of which is given
above, Ames says:
"From that day to this a detriment has always been
deemed a valid consideration." 8'
Such statement is accepted and with it the proof that the detri-
ment aspect of consideration originated in the surety case. That
seems perfectly clear when one notes that the other early cases
which are decided on the basis that the plaintiff has done some-
thing at the request of the promisor are also surety cases.
82
If, then, in 152o A. D. the generalization had been made which
is known to-day as the doctrine of consideration, there would
have been two types of cases to consider, (i) those in which the
promisor had received a benefit, and (2) those in which a prom-
isee had suffered a detriment at the request of a surety-promisor.
There would seem to be no serious objection to stating the
matter in the alternative as the courts commonly do, e. g.:
"A valuable consideration in the sense of the law may
consist in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing
See p. 674, supra.
8 (I888) 2 H~av. L. Rzv. i.
' E. g., Hunt v. Bate (1568) Dyer, 272, Williston, Cases on Contracts,
p. 152; Sidenham v. Worlington's Case (1585) 2 Leon. 224, Williston,
Op. cit., p. 153.
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to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or
responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the
other."88
But in the benefit cases, the matter might just as well be looked
at the other way around, i. e., from the point of view of what
the promisee has done. The now accepted definition of con-
sideration as a detriment to the promisee, is simpler, and perhaps
more scientific, for it announces the underlying principle which
is at the foundation of consideration, to wit, that a promise will
not be enforced unless the promisee has given something for it.
It is hoped that it has been shown that that principle goes back
to the beginning of things legal and that the precedents based
upon it are continuous from the earliest Anglo-Saxon times,
through the ages of Henry II, Edward I, Edward III, and
Henry VI until established anew in the reign of Henry VIII.
If the line of precedents appears to have been interrupted between
Edward III and Henry VIII by the absence for a time of cases
holding sureties alone on parol promises, it was not a true
break. The old tradition was never rejected and never for-
gotten. While during that period a generalization, which was
made in the quid pro quo of debt, looked more to the benefit
received by the promisor than to the detriment suffered by the
promisee, the cases were, nevertheless, manifestations of the con-
tinuing principle that a promise would not be enforced unless
the promisee had given something for it.
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